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USING REVENUE SHARING TO IMPLEMENT FLEXIBLE
PRICES: EVIDENCE FROM MOVIE EXHIBITION CONTRACTS*
RICARD GIL†
FRANCINE LAFONTAINE‡
Movie exhibition contracts entail revenue-sharing terms that go down
with weeks since release. We develop a simple model to show how the
form of these contracts can be explained by the distributors’ desire to
set flexible prices. We then use detailed data on theater-movie contracts
in Spain, where we exploit the information available at the time of
contracting for movies previously released in the U.S., and other movie
and theater characteristics, to show how the implications of our flexible
pricing argument are supported in the data, and differentiate our expla-
nation from prior, more standard risk-sharing and moral-hazard
explanations.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE LITERATURE ON SHARE CONTRACTS IN ECONOMICS has evolved in important
ways since its early days, when authors decried the existence of such back-
ward institutions as sharecropping. In a well-functioning market, they
argued, sharing would be replaced by single price contracts yielding first-
best efforts and outcomes (e.g., see Binswanger and Rosenzweig [1984] p.
16). The persistence of various forms of sharing in agriculture but also in
other industries in developed economies led authors to reconsider the ques-
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tion of why such contracts exist, and arrive at a new consensus whereby
they are seen as solutions to risk-sharing and incentive problems.1
In this paper, we consider a different explanation that we believe
accounts for the ubiquity of share contracts in the movie distribution
industry, the focus of our empirical analyses, but also in other contexts such
as retail real estate leasing and technology licensing contracts. In particular,
we argue that it is the uncertainty about the value of any given movie in any
given market at the time of contracting that leads distributors to rely on
revenue-sharing contracts. This explanation emphasizes the theaters’ par-
ticipation constraint, which translates into their incentive to show the
movie in a given week and/or renegotiate terms, rather than marginal effort
provision, as the major motivation behind revenue sharing.2
Our simple, flexible pricing model yields a number of predictions that we
test using data on the Spanish distribution industry. In particular, it implies
that distributor shares will be higher for movies that are expected to yield
higher box-office revenues. We exploit the information available at the time
of contracting about the success of movies previously released in the U.S. to
test this hypothesis. Second, because of the need to keep satisfying the
exhibitor’s participation constraint week after week, as box office revenues
decrease with weeks since release, the share to the distributor should
decrease from week to week as well. As ours is a pricing argument, the
model also emphasizes how higher values of alternative opportunities
for the exhibitor, higher exhibitor operational costs, and higher exhibitor
market shares should lead to lower distributor shares. We find support for
these predictions in our data, in addition to presenting evidence against the
traditional risk-sharing and marginal incentive argument for the form of
movie distribution contracts. On the latter, for example, we present evi-
dence that the contract terms of movies with below-expectations results are
more likely to be renegotiated after the fact. In other words, exhibitors are
protected from bad outcomes via renegotiation, thereby eliminating the
need to insure them via revenue sharing. We conclude that flexible pricing
is a much more promising explanation for the data patterns, and thus for
the use of share contracts in this, and we believe other markets as well.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe the
institutional features of our empirical setting, the distributor/theater rela-
tions in the motion picture industry in Spain. Next we develop a simple
1 See Cheung [1969] on their role in risk allocation, and Stiglitz [1974] and Holmstrom
[1979] on the basic incentive/insurance tradeoff emphasized in the agency literature. Reid
[1976] and Rubin [1978] proposed instead that these contracts solve incentive problems on
both sides of the equation, for principal and agent. Eswaran and Kotwal [1985] and Bhatta-
charyya and Lafontaine [1995] formalize these arguments.
2 See Oyer [2004] and Lafontaine and Masten [2002] for applications of similar ideas to
stock-option-based and truck-driver compensation schemes respectively. See also Dana and
Spier [2001], Cachon and Larivière [2005] and Mortimer [2008] for related arguments for the
reliance on share contracts in the video rental industry.
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model that illustrates how revenue sharing may be preferable to fixed fee
contracts because they provide more flexible prices in contexts where values
are unknown to both buyers and sellers. We also derive testable implica-
tions from our model. After describing our data in Section III, we show in
Section IV that our data support the predictions of our flexible pricing
model. We then discuss how many of the same data patterns make the usual
risk sharing and marginal effort incentive arguments unlikely explanations
for the use of sharing in this industry. Section V concludes.
II. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Although fixed salaries and prices are the norm in most employment and
supplier/buyer relationships, share contracting arises also in a wide variety
of contexts, both within and between firms. Sharing is particularly preva-
lent in certain industries or in relation to specific transactions, from real
estate brokerage to author/publisher contracts, from auctioneer to lawyer
compensation, and from retail real estate leasing to owner-operator con-
tracts in trucking. It is ubiquitous, moreover, in the movie industry where
we see talent being paid a share of revenues or profits (see Chisholm [1997],
Weinstein [1998]), studios receiving a share of box office revenues from the
movies they produce, distributors sharing box office revenues with exhibi-
tors or theaters (see Hanssen [2002], Filson et al. [2005], Gil [2004]), and
finally the same distributors sharing revenues with video stores (Cachon
and Larivière [2005], Dana and Spier [2001], Mortimer [2008]).
Hanssen [2002] discusses the emergence of revenue sharing in the 1920’s
in the U.S. movie distribution industry, while Dana and Spier [2001],
Cachon and Larivière [2005] and Mortimer [2008] describe how the U.S.
video rental industry recently moved to this form of contracting. In all
cases, the authors note that industry members chose to make the transition
from fixed fees to revenue sharing. This begs the question as to why revenue
sharing is preferred to fixed fees in these settings. In the remainder of this
section, we describe the market and institutional features of Spanish movie
distribution in some detail. We then develop a simple model that empha-
sizes the role of share contracts as a form of flexible pricing for distributors,
one that maintains exhibitor incentives to allocate screens to movies effi-
ciently while also allowing distributors to extract most of the downstream
surplus and avoid some renegotiation costs.
II(i). Institutional Setting
We now describe the institutional features of the Spanish movie exhibition
industry. Contracts in this industry are very similar to those used in the
U.S. movie exhibition industry. For example, according to Filson et al.
[2005], 89% of their 2,769 movie-exhibition contracts (all of them from one
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chain of thirteen theaters located in Saint Louis, Missouri) display the same
sliding scale form that we find in our data. Revenue sharing is a much more
recent phenomenon in this industry in Spain, however. While the U.S.
industry moved to revenue sharing in the 1920’s according to Hanssen
[2002], industry insiders indicate that this form of contracting became
popular in the 1970’s in Spain. Before that, distributors were renting
movies to exhibitors for a fixed upfront fee. Practitioners claim that the
change to revenue sharing occurred because distributors saw this as a way
to capture rents previously left with exhibitors.3
The assignment of movies to theaters in Spain begins with visits by
distributors to exhibitors once or twice a year, at which point the distribu-
tors show their movie portfolios for the upcoming season. During these
visits, the distributor and exhibitor agree on the number of copies of each
movie that the exhibitor will take. This agreement does not yet define which
theater, among those owned by the exhibitor, will show which movie
because the release dates for most movies are not yet fixed. Note that the
agreements are not predicated on any notion of exclusivity for the exhibitor
locally. Once the release dates of a movie, and competing movies, are
decided upon, distributors and exhibitors negotiate the assignment of
movies to specific theaters. At this stage, distributor shares are still to be
determined. These are negotiated sometime between a month and a week
before the Spanish release date and before the distributor sends a physical
movie copy to a theater. The parties negotiate separate contracts for each
movie/theater combination. In other words, transactions are not bundled
across movies in a theater, nor do they need to be identical for all theaters
– or all of a particular exhibitor’s theaters – showing the same movie. There
is no variance in the type of contract, however. In all cases, the contracts
stipulate series of weekly box office revenue shares that decrease with weeks
since release, and never involve fixed fees. The relevant transaction that is
priced in the contract, and for which renegotiation may occur as described
further below, is therefore at the movie-theater-week level. Our contract
term data are also at this level.
Exhibitors set movie ticket prices. They do not change the price to
movie-goers in the short run based on movie quality or attendance (see
3 After the move to share contracts in the U.S., exhibitors complained that the new shares
were exorbitant compared to the fixed fees paid under the previous regime (Hanssen [2002],
p. 388, footnote 25). This suggests again that the new share contracts allowed distributors to
extract more of the exhibitor’s profits. In Spain, the industry experimented with different
forms of contracts before arriving at the current standard. The first revenue-sharing contracts
stipulated sharing percentages (to distributors) based on total national box-office revenues
per week or during the entire run of the movie contracted upon. However, these stipulated
several ranges of revenues and shares to be applied to each range. Despite the increase in
ex-ante contract complexity, industry practitioners indicate that ex-post renegotiation
occurred in a large number of cases. These contract forms were abandoned and replaced by
the current contractual form – which, according to industry members, was simpler to nego-
tiate ex-ante – over the years that followed.
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Einav and Orbach [2007]). According to Filson et al. [2005], practitioners
provide several explanations for this, including eliminating consumer
uncertainty about prices, as well as the potential cost, in terms of goodwill,
of charging more for more popular movies, and the difficulty of keeping
track of which movie customers have paid for in multiplexes. For our
purposes, we simply assume the price is constant and take it to be exog-
enous, though we allow it to vary across theaters. In reality, prices vary
little across theaters in a city. With fixed movie ticket prices, revenue
sharing amounts to per unit (per moviegoer) pricing, with the peculiarity
that distributors get decreasing per movie-goer revenues as their share of
revenues goes down with weeks since release.
Though the contract stipulates the share of box office revenues for a
number of weeks on the screen, the number of weeks contracted upon is
non-binding. The exhibitor, not the distributor, decides how long to keep a
movie on the screen. The exhibitor can stop showing the movie at any time
within the set of weeks contracted upon, or keep it longer than contracted
for. Industry norms imply that the last distributor share stipulated in the
contract applies to all weeks beyond those contracted upon. We argue that
this set of decisions, of which movies to put on which screens and for how
long, is the central role of exhibitors in this market. And consistent with
Dana and Spier [2001], Cachon and Larivière [2005], and Ioannou,
Mortimer and Mortimer [2011], we show, in our simple model below, that
revenue sharing affects these decisions as well as the frequency of renego-
tiation requests.
Finally, regardless of the contract terms agreed upon for box-office
revenue, the exhibitor retains full residual claims over concession profits.
This occurs, we are told, in part because it would be prohibitively costly for
exhibitors to track – and for distributors to verify – the concession sales
associated with customers of each movie in multi-screen theaters. Moreo-
ver, given that they are local, exhibitors are in the best position to tailor
concession offerings to the tastes of their customers, and supervise labor.
From an incentive perspective, then, it is optimal to give them full owner-
ship of the profits arising from such activities.4 Of course, the ownership of
the concession profits also gives exhibitors incentives to keep on the screens
movies that attract numerous customers into their theaters, and perhaps
keep prices lower than what distributors would prefer (see Vogel [2001]).
For simplicity, however, in modeling the interactions between exhibitor
and distributor, we abstract from concession sales.
4 See Slade [1996] for another context – gasoline retailing – where the downstream agent
retains full residual claimant rights on other activities (i.e., car repairs or convenience store
sales) regardless of the agreement that governs gasoline sales at the station. Note that while
concession sales are only a small part of the total operations of a theater, they can make the
difference between profitable and unprofitable operation (see Vogel [2001]).
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II(ii). Revenue Sharing as Flexible Pricing
Assume a distributor and an exhibitor contracting over revenues of movie
i in theater j. To focus on the effect of movie value uncertainty, we assume
both parties are risk neutral, and there is no asymmetry of information. For
simplicity, we also make a number of assumptions about the cost and
revenues of the distributor and exhibitor. In particular, we assume that
• Movie i will yield non-negative revenues for two periods only. First
period revenues, R1 of movie i are distributed uniformly, i.e. R1~U[0,v],
where v is known to both parties. Second period revenues are also
distributed uniformly, but bounded from above by the realization of
revenues in period 1, with decay rate g such that R2~ U[0,gR1] where
0 < g < 1. Revenues beyond period 2 are R3 = R4 = . . . 0.
• As per practice, the contract terms are determined prior to the release of
the movie, and thus prior to receiving information about the realization
of R1.
• Theater operational costs, k, are constant from period to period, as are
distributor operational costs, kd. Since the latter are small, we normalize
them to 0.
• The theater has an outside option whose value is determined by the
other movies released in periods 1 and 2. We assume this opportunity
cost is uniformly distributed in both periods such that ct~U[0,c] for
t = 1,2.
• The distributor can make ‘take-it-or-leave it offers’ and chooses the
terms of the contract to maximize its profits.
As is standard practice in retail settings such as this one, the payments
in this industry go from exhibitor to distributor, i.e., the exhibitor must
pay its supplier (the owner of the movie rights). We compare three con-
tractual forms, namely i) a contract that specifies revenue-sharing terms,
one per period, s1 and s2, where st is the share that goes to the distributor
each period; ii) a contract that specifies lump-sum per-period fees to the
distributor, T1 and T2; and iii) a contract that specifies an ex-ante unique
lump-sum fees to the distributor, T. In addition, as mentioned above, the
exhibitor can request an adjustment in its compensation when it finds
the results of a movie in a given period are lower than expected. Because
payments to the distributor are adjusted down automatically under
revenue sharing, per Masten [1988] and Klein [1996], such adjustments
should be needed less frequently under revenue sharing than under con-
tracts that involve fixed fees. We account for this in our simple model by
assuming that the distributor expects a higher cost of renegotiation under
both period-by-period and upfront fixed-fee contracts than under revenue
sharing. We use G to represent this difference in renegotiation costs. As it
is unclear which of the two types of fixed fee contracts would lead to
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higher renegotiation costs, for simplicity, we assume that G is the same
for both of these contract types.5
In Appendix A, we derive the optimal distributor shares and fixed fees
for these three contract types. We show that while there is no closed-form
solution for the optimal share in period 2, the revenue sharing contract is
more profitable for the distributor than either the per-period or upfront
fixed fee contracts under reasonable parameter values. In fact, if we assume
that the theater expected opportunity cost, c/2, should be similar to the
revenues that the theater gets from movie i in expectation, which is a share
of about one half of expected revenues, or .5*v/2, we get that c can be
approximated by v/2. In that case, the condition for revenue sharing with
s2 = .5 to be preferable to an upfront fixed fee contract becomes G > (g2 –
2g + 1.5)/4g, which cannot be satisfied for very small values of g (i.e., for
g = 0), but will be easily satisfied for any reasonable per-period revenue
retention parameter. Empirically, we find that second-period revenues are
often in the 50 to 60% range of first-week results, values that would clearly
lead to revenue sharing as a preferred mode of contracting.6
As described in Appendix A, our simple model yields several predictions
about the optimal box office revenue share contract that we take to the data
below. In particular, we find that in the optimal revenue-sharing contract,
distributor shares are:
1. increasing in the expected revenues of the movie (higher v/2 and g in the
model);
2. decreasing in the number of periods since release;
3. decreasing in the opportunity cost of the exhibitor, c.
4. decreasing in the operational costs of the exhibitor, k.
In addition, we explore the effect of (v/2) and g on the rate of decline of
distributor shares from period to period. We find that higher values of g are
associated with a slower decline in distributor shares over time, not sur-
prisingly. However, the effect of v on the rate of change in distributor
shares is ambiguous as both s1 and s2 are increasing in v. Since we cannot
identify v and g separately in our data, as both are associated with higher
expected values for the movie, we explore the net effect of increases in the
expected value of the movie on the rate of change in distributor shares
empirically below.
5 There are more potential terms to be renegotiated under per period fees but there is less
at stake each time, so the cost of achieving a compromise may be lower per renegotiation
under per period fees. Moreover, it is more likely that the movie is not shown in period
2 under per period than upfront fixed fees since the cost of showing the movie is 0 in
period 2 under upfront fees. Of course, no renegotiation cost will be incurred if the movie is
not shown. Thus, in the end, we cannot say a priori which form of contract will lead to higher
renegotiation costs.
6 For example, see www.the-numbers.com for data on week-to-week revenues in the U.S.
market.
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In the next section, we describe our data and how we operationalize the
different parameters or theater/movie characteristics in the model for our
empirical analyses. Since our model assumes away risk aversion and incen-
tive problems, it is important to note, before introducing the data and
empirical methodology, that some of the model’s predictions differ drasti-
cally from those of risk-sharing and double-sided moral hazard models. In
particular, under risk-sharing the distributor should take higher shares for
riskier movies, ceteris paribus, since the convention in the literature is that
the distributor is less risk-averse than the exhibitor is.7 Similarly, under
double-sided moral hazard, higher distributor shares would be optimal
under circumstances where distributor effort matters more. Yet distributor
effort is unlikely to be especially important for movies that, at the time of
contracting, are already expected to do well. Thus the first implication
above is central to the goal of this paper, and remains our main argument
to demonstrate that flexible pricing, rather than risk sharing or double-
sided moral hazard, is the main goal of revenue sharing in the movie
distribution context. In our empirical analyses below, we provide evidence
in support of our argument by comparing observations across movies with
different revenue expectations and risk levels.
III. THE DATA
We have a unique data set with detailed information on the contracts used in
the distribution of 510 movies shown in Spain in up to 96 different theaters
between January, 2001, and June, 2002, for a total of 13,816 contracts. In this
section, we summarize some of the main features of the data and contracts.
Further details can be found in the data appendix, Appendix B.
The data are from the largest seven exhibitors in Spain. These firms
account for roughly 10% of all theaters, 30% of all screens, and 40% of all
box office revenues in the country. Some of the theaters in the data,
however, are owned by distributors. Distributors rely on contracts with the
same structure as those used for independent theaters when they show their
own movies in their own theaters. Since it is less clear what distributor
motivations might be in setting up contracts with their own theaters, we
exclude these contracts from our analyses below. This does not eliminate
any theaters from our data as theaters owned by distributors still show
movies of other distributors. Moreover, we have verified that our results
7 One reason to assume that distributors are less risk averse than exhibitors is that they
distribute their movie in a variety of markets, and thus have more geographically diversified
activities, than do the local exhibitors. Note that fixed fees are not a required feature of
optimal contracts when non-linear schemes are allowed. However, in our context, the con-
tracts are not non-linear, and thus a fixed fee would be required to obtain the desired
distribution of income once the proportion is chosen to address risk-sharing or moral hazard
issues.
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are qualitatively the same if we include the contracts of distributors
showing their own movies on their own screens. We also exclude a few
contracts (965 of them) that do not represent first-run contracts. Our final
sample relates to 430 movies shown in up to 91 theaters owned by our seven
exhibitors in 51 different cities, for a total of 10,167 contracts. These 430
movies were distributed by 22 different distributors. Note that during the
eighteen months that our data cover, the average theater showed 111
movies, while the average distributor dealt with 40 theaters for each of the
20 movies it distributed, or, in other words, some 800 contracts.
In Table I, we present descriptive statistics for our variables of interest,
beginning with our main dependent variable, distributor share, which we
TABLE I
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Movie/theater/week Level Data
Distributor Share 52321 50.08 6.76 30 60.00
Movie/theater Level Data
Max Distributor Share 10167 57.58 3.75 30 60.00
Min Distributor Share 10167 44.02 5.84 30 60.00
# Weeks Stipulated 10167 5.22 2.83 1 31
# Weeks Between Max and Min Share 10167 3.38 2.08 -1† 17
# Weeks at Max Share 10167 1.28 0.56 1 10
Actual Run Length 3706 4.16 3.35 1 33
Distributor Share1 10167 50.61 3.94 30 60.00
Movie Level Data
Spain Box Office (€M) 430 2.28 4.01 0.002 30.93
U.S. Release 430 0.63 0.48 0 1
U.S. Box Office ($M) 269 47.27 61.46 0.001†† 403.7
Movie Duration (in minutes) 430 107.04 16.53 75 186
Released during Christmas week? 430 0.03 0.18 0 1
Released during Other Major Holiday? 430 0.11 0.32 0 1
U.S. Box Office of Concurrent Releases 430 129.65 93.20 0 403.7
Distributor Share2 430 49.30 3.59 30.00 60.00
Max Distributor Share3 430 55.78 4.51 30.00 60.00
Min Distributor Share3 430 44.65 4.56 30.00 60.00
# Weeks Stipulated3 430 4.30 2.24 1 22
# Weeks Between Max and Min Share3 430 2.58 1.55 0 8.43
# Weeks at Max Share3 430 1.18 0.40 1 4
Actual Run Length3 313 3.66 3.34 1 26
Theater Level Data
# Screens 91 7.32 3.51 1 17
Exhibitor Market Share (in seats) 91 0.37 0.32 0.02 1
Theater Age 70 6.03 7.66 0 54
1The data are at the movie/theater/week level. The movie/theater level information is generated by averaging
across weeks at each theater.
2The data are at the movie/theater/week level. The movie-level information is generated by first averaging
across weeks at a theater, and then across theaters.
3The data are at the movie/theater level. The movie level data represent averages across theaters.
†The minimum number of weeks is minus one here because one movie in the sample started at a low distributor
share and then the share went up after a week. The distributor gave up first week revenues in order to convince
exhibitors to show the movie, a Japanese movie that had not been released in the U.S. previously.
††This U.S. Box Office revenue figure is for ‘Strictly Sinatra,’ a U.K. production that collected $1,232 during
its one week on U.S. screens, and was later released in Spain.
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observe at the movie/theater/week level. We then describe data available on
a per-contract (or movie/theater) rather than per-week basis. This includes
information on the terms of the contract, namely the maximum and
minimum distributor shares stipulated in the contract, along with the
number of weeks that these contract terms apply to. We also present here
data on the actual run length of the movie per theater, which we have for
a subset of our data. Finally, we show distributor shares again. Comparing
the mean here versus that at the movie theatre/week level reveals that
weighing by the number of weeks that each movie is contracted on does not
affect the mean distributor share much at all.
In the next part of Table I we summarize those variables that are avail-
able at the movie level, namely the box office results of the movie in
Spain, as well as whether or not the movie was released in the U.S., and
if so, its U.S. box office results. We also report data on the duration of
the movies, in minutes, as well as information concerning the timing of
the releases, whether at Christmas or at a time corresponding to other
major holidays, and the ‘known’ value of other movies released at the
same time, measured by their total U.S. box office.8 We report distributor
shares here as well. When compared to the movie/theater level, averaging
at the movie level gives as much weight to movies shown in fewer theaters
as to more popular movies shown in several theaters. Consistent with our
explanation for the shares, we find that the average distributor share is
now somewhat lower. The maximum share stipulated is also lower as are
the number of weeks contracted on and actual movie run length.
In the last part of Table I, we present information available at the
theater level, including data on the size of the theaters (number of
screens), exhibitor market share, calculated as the proportion of all
theater seats in the city accounted for by the owner of theater i, and the
age of the theaters.9 We use these data to measure both theater costs (k)
and potentially theater bargaining power, which in our model would be
captured by a higher potential return from showing an alternative movie,
namely a higher c.10
In the contracts, the stipulated revenue share for the distributors aver-
ages about 50%. In the literature on sharecropping, authors also have
found a tendency for contracts to involve a 50/50 split. However, while
8 We use data on all U.S.-released movies that are released in Spain during the period of our
sample to create this variable, whether or not we have contract data for the movies in
question.
9 Unfortunately, we could only ascertain the construction year for 70 of the 91 theaters in
the data.
10 This approach is consistent with Svejnar [1986], who suggests that asymmetric bargain-
ing power in negotiations stems from factors related to each bargainer’s relative fear of
disagreement. Thus better outside options for theaters yield better bargaining power vis-à-vis
distributors. See also Ho [2009] for a recent application.
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sharecropping contracts tend to stipulate this division directly, here it is
obtained by having the distributor receive more than 57% of box office
revenues on average for the first week or two, and then a lower share in the
following weeks, down to an average share of 44% at the end of the
predicted run of the movie.
Distributors specify shares for about five weeks per movie on average,
with a standard deviation of almost three weeks. Thus a number of
movies are contracted upon for very short periods of time, basically just
a couple of weeks. When we look at the number of weeks stipulated
variable in the third part of Table I, where the data are weighted by
movie instead of movie/theater, we find a much lower average number of
weeks. As mentioned above, this indicates that less popular movies,
shown in fewer theaters, are contracted upon for shorter periods of time.
Comparing the data at the movie/theater and movie level also reveals that
the extra week contracted upon corresponds mostly to more time going
from maximum to minimum distributor share for the more popular
movies, not more time at the maximum. Finally, the data on realized
movie run lengths show that movies last an average of about one month
on the screens, but that there is more variance in movie run durations
than in stipulated contract periods. Moreover the actual run lengths are,
on average, shorter than the period contracted on. This confirms that the
contracts are not binding when it comes to keeping movies on screens –
exhibitors can pull movies before the end of the period for which terms
are stipulated in the contract. At the same time, some movies remain on
screens beyond the number of weeks contracted upon.
Sixty-three per cent of movies released in Spain are released first in the
U.S. These movies are shown in more theaters in Spain than non-U.S.
released movies, as indicated by the fact that the proportion of movies
released in the U.S. is seventy-three percent when calculated on a movie/
theater basis (not shown). The movies released in the U.S. prior to their
release in Spain collected an average of $47 million during their U.S. run.
However, there is much variance within this set as well. Note that movies
first released in the U.S. are not necessarily produced in the U.S. – most
U.K. movies are shown in the U.S. prior to their release in Spain, for
example.
As for theater characteristics, exhibitors control more than a third of
all the seats in their market (city) on average. In some cases (19% of
theaters), the owners have 100% of the local capacity. Finally, the major-
ity of the theaters in the data are modern multi-screen theaters: theaters
have seven screens on average, and have been opened for only six years,
though some have been in existence for much longer. In our sample, only
six theaters opened prior to 1990 with the oldest opening in 1948. These
older theaters have significantly fewer screens (roughly 4 screens per
theater) and a smaller number of total seats (1,100 versus, 1,650).
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IV. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS
In this section, we test the predictions from Section II, starting with the
effect of movie value on distributor shares and their evolution over time
since release. We test these predictions in two steps – first, we show that
a movie’s results in the U.S. market can be used to predict how well the
same movie will do in Spain, and that such predictions are more precise for
movies that did better in the U.S. market. We then show that, as predicted,
distributors request higher shares for those movies that they predict will do
better in Spain. Next we examine the effects of exhibitor opportunity costs,
using the value of alternative movies released in the same week as well as a
measure of their share of the local exhibition markets, and the effect of
exhibitor operational costs, which we approximate using theater size and
age. Note that these effects can also be interpreted in terms of increased
exhibitor bargaining power resulting from more market power, better alter-
natives or better location or facilities. Finally, we test the implications of
our model for the frequency and form of contract renegotiation in this
industry. This last piece of evidence also will be important when we evalu-
ate the role of risk-sharing and double-sided moral hazard as explanations
for the use of revenue sharing contracts in this industry in Section IV(iv).
IV(i). Predicting Movie Success in Spain
Table II shows how useful information about U.S. box office is in predict-
ing Spanish box office figures. The regression results indicate that box-
office revenues in the two countries are highly correlated, as shown in the
first two columns. They also show in columns 3 and 4,where the dependent
variables are the absolute value of the error term from the estimations in
columns 1 and 2, respectively, divided by the predicted value of Spanish
TABLE II










(1) (2) (1) (2)
U.S. Box Office ($M) 0.060*** -0.005***
(0.005) (0.002)
ln (U.S. Box Office) 0.610*** -0.014***
(0.050) (0.003)
Constant 0.106 3.592*** 1.164*** 0.306***
(0.177) (0.869) (0.193) (0.052)
Observations 269 269 269 269
Mean Squared Error 6.55 2.31 4.10 0.01
R-squared 0.68 0.43 0.03 0.12
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
There is an 0.82 correlation between U.S. Box Office and Spain Box Office, and 0.65 correlation between their
log counterparts.
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box office in these same regressions, that the prediction errors are also
smaller for movies that do better in the U.S.
Interviews with distribution and exhibition managers in Spain con-
firmed the importance of U.S. market information in their evaluation of
the market potential for a movie in Spain. First, the managers indicated
that they do rely on box office revenues in the U.S. to generate forecasts
of movie revenues in Spain. Second, the managers confirmed that they
view movies that have collected high levels of U.S. box office revenues as
least risky, followed by those that collect medium and then low levels of
revenues in the U.S. Managers also reported that local or European
movies not previously released in the U.S. are the riskiest type of movies
that they handle since they do not come to them with a market outcome
that they can rely upon.
IV(ii). Distributor Shares and Movie Success In Spain
Figure 1 shows how distributor shares change over weeks since release for
























Average Distributor Share per Week since Release
Figure 1
Average Distributor Share per Week since Release
Note: The set of movies within each one of the four movie categories is changing across
weeks due to differences in the length of each movie contract.
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office outcomes in the U.S.11 This figure illustrates two important patterns,
both of which are consistent with our predictions. First, even though only
more successful movies are contracted upon for long periods of time,
average distributor shares are systematically lower for all categories of
movies the longer the time since release. Second, Figure 1 shows that
distributors obtain a larger share of revenues for movies that are expected
to do well. More specifically, average distributor shares are greatest for the
set of 33 movies that did best in the U.S., followed by those 51 that did
between $50M and $100M in the U.S. These differences, moreover, are
statistically significant up to week 11. Movies that did relatively poorly in
the U.S., namely the 185 movies that obtained less than $50 million in box
office there, and non-U.S. released movies (161) are contracted upon using
very similar, and statistically not different, shares on average.12
One potential explanation for the patterns in Figure 1 that would be
consistent with risk-sharing but that we can rule out is that distributors of
non-U.S. released movies may be smaller firms, and hence more likely to be
risk averse, than the distributors of blockbuster movies. We find the same
patterns (not shown) in distributor shares after controlling for distributor
fixed effects – in other words, even within distributors, blockbusters
command larger distributor shares but shares are the same for movies that
did poorly in the U.S. and those that were never released there. We explore
the relationship between distributor share and movie success further in
Table III, where we show how distributor shares stipulated in the contract
relate to U.S. box office revenues and how they change with weeks since
release. We first show results obtained when we do not control for any fixed
effects, followed by results with theater, and then theater and calendar
week, and finally theater, week and week-since-release fixed effects. We also
control for movie duration, in minutes, under the assumption that it might
affect its pricing. Since our data are at the movie/theater/week level, and we
expect contracts to be correlated within movies, and possibly across theat-
ers, we cluster standard errors at the movie and theater level (two-way
clustering).
Results in Table III are consistent across specifications, which implies
that the patterns in distributor shares and how they relate to a movie’s
popularity are unaffected by the inclusion of seasonality effects and theater
characteristics. The results are also consistent with the predictions of our
simple flexible pricing model. In all specifications, while the coefficient on
11 In Figure 1, the set of movies within each one of the four movie categories is changing
across weeks due to differences in the length of each movie contract.
12 Movies not released in the U.S. average 1.13 million Euros in Spain versus 1.16 million
Euros for movies that were released in the U.S. but collected less than $50 million in box
office. While the mean results in Spain are not statistically different for these two sets of
movies, the standard deviation in box office results is statistically greater for movies not
previously released in the U.S.
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U.S. release is negative contrary to what one might expect, the coefficient
on (log) U.S. box office is such that distributors of movies that achieve even
very modest results in the U.S., in the order of $15M to $17M in box office
revenues, obtain shares that are as high as those of non-U.S. released
movies.13 This explains why movies that did below $50M in the U.S., which
averaged about $17M in that market, show shares that are so similar to
those of non-U.S. released films in Figure 1.
As mentioned previously, we cannot distinguish v and g in our data.
However, our model predicts that a higher g should lead to slower decreases
in distributor shares, while the relation between v and the rate of decrease
in distributor shares is ambiguous. Results in Table III, however, show that
distributor shares in fact do decline less rapidly over time since release for
movies that are expected to do better in Spain. Thus the overall effect of
higher expected movie revenues (combination of v and g) is to slow the
decrease in distributor shares over time since release. Specifically, while
these shares decline by more than two percentage points each week, per the
coefficient on weeks since release, the positive interaction effect between
13 For example, in column 1, exp(3.14/1.13) - 1= 15.1.
TABLE III
DISTRIBUTOR SHARES PER MOVIE/THEATER/WEEK
Independent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
U.S. Release -3.12*** -3.13*** -3.07*** -2.75** -2.15*
(0.76) (0.75) (0.82) (1.26) (1.28)
Ln[1+U.S. Box Office] 1.12*** 1.11*** 1.10*** 1.01*** 0.76*









0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.005*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Christmas Week 0.81 0.84
(0.83) (0.82)
Other Holiday Week 0.014 0.020
(0.26) (0.25)
Ln[1+U.S. Box Office of
Concurrent Releases]
-0.060 -0.051 -0.063 0.38 0.44
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.59) (0.59)
Movie Duration (in minutes) 0.011 0.011 0.013 0.026 0.025
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.019) (0.019)
Constant 55.4*** 55.5*** 55.4*** 42.7*** 44.2***
(1.66) (1.65) (1.73) (3.70) (4.05)
Theater FE No Yes No No No
Week-Theater FE No No Yes No No
Week-Theater-Week since
Release FE
No No No Yes Yes
Observations 52321 52321 52321 52321 52321
R-squared 0.56 0.56 0.61 0.86 0.86
Standard errors clustered at both the movie and theater level (two-way clustering), in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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U.S. box office and week since release implies that every 10 million dollars
of U.S. box office reduces the weekly decline in distributor share by 0.03
percentage points, or 1.39% (1000.03/2.16) based on results in column 1.
Results in the first two columns of Table III, where we do not control for
seasonality using fixed effects, allow us also to consider the effect of high
demand by moviegoers, usually associated with major holidays such as
Christmas and other holidays, and the effect of the exhibitor opportunity
cost, measured by the U.S. box office results of all movies released the same
week as movie i, on distributor shares. We find that while the directions of
the effects are consistent with our flexible pricing model, none of these
variables has statistically significant effects on distributor shares.14 Simi-
larly, distributor shares are higher for longer movies, but this effect is also
not significant. Note that a priori this result could have gone either way
since one might expect that lengthy movies do not allow as many showings,
resulting in lower box office results (or put equivalently, higher theater
operational costs). However, longer duration movies also tend to be good
(in fact, in our data one extra minute of movie length is associated with 1.5
additional million of U.S. box office); or rather, good movies can afford to
be long. In any case, our main results remain the same when we exclude
movie duration from our regressions.
In the last column of Table III, we add one other variable, ‘Standard
Deviation of Forecast Error,’ to our most flexible specification. This vari-
able is defined as the standard deviation of the forecast error for the group
of movies that achieved similar box office outcomes in the U.S., where the
groups are deciles of the U.S. box office revenue distribution, and the
forecast errors are obtained from the regression in column 2 of Table II.
We created an eleventh category by grouping all movies not released in the
U.S., and using the deviation of their results from the mean results of the
group as our forecast error. We then calculated the standard deviation of
the forecast errors for each group. As expected, based on our flexible
pricing model where prices should be based on expected values only, results
in Table III show no relationship between the ‘Standard Deviation of
Forecast Error’ and distributor share. Note that, whereas this lack of
correlation between distributor share and the variability of forecast error is
very consistent with flexible pricing, it is very detrimental to the risk-
sharing argument which predicts higher distributor shares for riskier
movies once expected revenues are controlled for (assuming again, per the
literature, that exhibitors are more risk-averse than distributors).
Finally, while not shown in the table, we also examined how movie genre
might affect observed shares, under the presumption that box office results
may be less predictable for some movie genres (e.g., science fiction vs.
14 We also examined the effect of only same genre concurrent releases. Again, we found that
this measure of opportunity cost never had a significant effect on the contracted shares.
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mainstream comedies). In no case were movie genre fixed effects significant
as a group in our regressions if we included other types of fixed effects.
Moreover, their inclusion did not affect any of the results above.
In Table IV, we shun the use of theater fixed effects to explore how
theater characteristics affect distributor and exhibitor shares. We find first
that, consistent with the fact that the introduction of theater fixed effects
did not alter the conclusions we reached in Table III, our results above
also are robust to replacing these fixed effects with theater characteristics.
Moreover, the evidence concerning the effects of theater characteristics is
also consistent with the predictions of our flexible pricing argument. In
particular, we find that older theaters, which we expect to have higher
costs but also potentially to be located in more valuable locations, get
larger shares of box office revenue. In addition, distributors get lower
shares when dealing with larger theaters and/or exhibitors with larger
market shares.
Though not shown in the tables, we have verified the robustness of our
results in several other ways. In particular, we reproduced all our analyses
using the average distributor share per movie and week since release, rather
TABLE IV
DISTRIBUTOR SHARES PER MOVIE/THEATER/WEEK
Independent Variables: (1) (2) (3)
U.S. Release -3.10*** -4.19*** -3.89***
(0.75) (0.81) (0.84)
Ln[1 + U.S. Box Office] 1.10*** 1.54*** 1.46***
(0.19) (0.19) (0.20)
Week Since Release -2.14***
(0.12)
Week Since Release*U.S. Box Office 0.003*** 0.0004 0.0003
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Theater Age -0.034 -0.081*** -0.078***
(0.031) (0.026) (0.025)
Screens -0.021 -0.044* -0.038
(0.017) (0.026) (0.024)
Exhibitor Market Share -0.21* -0.15 -0.15
(0.12) (0.14) (0.13)
Christmas Week 0.88 1.16
(0.82) (0.94)
Other Holiday Week 0.007 -0.012
(0.26) (0.24)
Ln[1+U.S. Box Office of Concurrent Releases] -0.066 -0.11 -0.15
(0.16) (0.15) (0.15)
Movie Duration (minutes) 0.011 0.016 0.018
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Constant 55.8*** 47.9*** 55.8***
(1.67) (1.63) (1.68)
Week since Release Fixed Effects No Yes Yes
Week Fixed Effects No No Yes
Observations 46427 46427 46427
R-squared 0.55 0.66 0.67
Standard errors clustered at both the movie and theater level (two-way clustering), in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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than the actual movie/theater/week since release share data, as our depe-
ndent variable. Note that this average share abstracts from variation in
distributor shares across theaters within a movie and week since release,
which amounts to eliminating only 6% of the total variation in our data.
Regression analyses with this alternative dependent variable also weigh
movies that did not do so well at the box office as much as movies released
in many more theaters, and ensures that the significance of our results is not
an artifact of using several observations per movie week (though this
concern is also alleviated via clustering in the regressions above). We focus
on results obtained with the more detailed data above since the use of an
average share across theaters prevents us from examining the impact
of theater specific characteristics. In other specifications we also added
distributor, as well as distributor/theater, fixed effects to eliminate the
possibility that matches between distributors and theaters (or exhibitors)
could bias our results. In all cases, we found that our results above were
robust to these alternative specifications.
Finally, in Table V, we show how the maximum distributor shares stipu-
lated in each contract, the number of weeks the contract covers, and the
number of weeks that the movie actually is kept on the screen (Actual Run
Length) all relate to the predicted success of the movie, as captured by U.S.
release and U.S. box office revenues. These analyses involve contract-level
variables so the number of observations is limited to the total number of
TABLE V
MOVIE/THEATER CONTRACT TERMS
Max Share Weeks Contracted Actual Run Length
U.S. Release -2.60*** -2.18*** -2.48*** -1.94*** -2.95*** -2.53***
(0.71) (0.80) (0.44) (0.36) (0.62) (0.50)
Ln[1 + U.S. Box Office] 1.10*** 1.06*** 0.96*** 0.79*** 1.11*** 1.02***
(0.14) (0.23) (0.13) (0.11) (0.18) (0.15)
Theater Age -0.091*** -0.069*** 0.036*
(0.033) (0.020) (0.020)
Screens -0.051 0.066 0.15***
(0.035) (0.041) (0.036)
Exhibitor Market Share -0.25 -0.65** -0.58**
(0.23) (0.31) (0.29)
Christmas Week 0.45 1.30* 1.17
(0.83) (0.77) (1.43)
Other Holiday Week 0.81** 0.45 0.59
(0.41) (0.27) (0.56)
Ln[1+U.S. Box Office of
Concurrent Releases]
-0.025 0.074 -0.045 -0.22 -0.14 -0.34
(0.12) (0.30) (0.084) (0.16) (0.14) (0.24)
Constant 57.5*** 56.4*** 4.45*** 6.67*** 2.37*** 4.69***
(0.82) (1.48) (0.61) (0.79) (0.73) (1.15)
Movie-Release Week FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Theater FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 9110 10167 9110 10167 3472 3706
R-Squared 0.15 0.27 0.19 0.42 0.18 0.45
Standard errors clustered at both the movie and theater level (two-way clustering), in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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contracts in our data. This also constrains the type of fixed effects we can
include. For each variable, we show results when we include no fixed
effects, followed by results obtained with theater and movie week-of-release
fixed effects.
Our flexible pricing model for share contracts in this industry implies
that movies with higher expected revenues in the Spanish market –
namely those that collected higher box office revenues in the U.S.– should
have higher starting maximum shares and longer movie runs. We show
evidence of the former in the first two columns and of the latter in the last
two columns. Even though the distributor keeps a higher share of the
revenues for a longer period, exhibitors keep the higher U.S. box office
movies running longer – given high Spanish attendance for these, it is
profitable for exhibitors to keep showing them despite the more adverse
contract terms. We also find that contracts for higher U.S. box-office
movies have higher maximum distributor shares and that they involve
sharing terms for a greater number of weeks than contracts of movies
that were not as successful in their U.S. run. Since there is less uncer-
tainty about the demand for these movies, these contracts are more effec-
tive in providing the adequate incentives to exhibitors to keep the movie
on the screen for a longer period.
Results in Table V also show that maximum distributor shares are
lower when movies are shown in older and in larger theaters, in terms of
number of screens, and in those theaters owned by higher market-share
exhibitors. We find also that older theaters contract for fewer weeks, but
keep movies longer on their screens, while theaters with more screens
both contract for more weeks and keep movies longer on their screens.
The latter is likely due to the flexibility that multiplexes benefit from as
they can move the movie to rooms with fewer seats over time. Theaters
owned by high-market share exhibitors, on the other hand, tend to keep
movies on the screen fewer weeks, on average. Finally, movies released
during holiday weeks or around Christmas are contracted upon for more
weeks on average, but their actual runs are not statistically significantly
longer than that of movies released in other weeks.
In sum, results in Table V confirm that movies with even modest out-
comes in the U.S. (>$8m to $14m depending on the specification) have
higher max shares, are contracted upon for longer periods of time,
and are kept on the screen longer than non-U.S. released movies. These
and other results in the table are consistent with the predictions from
our model.
IV(iii). Movie Results and Ex-post Renegotiation
As noted earlier, it is standard practice in the industry for distributors to
renegotiate exhibitor shares when movie revenues are unexpectedly low
USING REVENUE SHARING TO IMPLEMENT FLEXIBLE PRICES 205
© 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial Economics
for a given week.15 Although accounts are settled only at the end of the
movie’s run, industry insiders point out that distributors renegotiate weekly
shares, and that they can easily identify the weeks for which shares will be
renegotiated as they observe the weekly results for their movies. In a sample
of roughly 19,000 theater/movie/week observations, Gil [2004] finds that
distributors agreed to modify the share paid to exhibitors one out of every
two weeks on average. In no case do they renegotiate in favor of the
distributor. In other words, it is because the participation constraint of the
exhibitor is not satisfied, and not because of problems with low distributor
compensation, that the parties renegotiate.16
In our view, the one-sidedness of the renegotiation process results from
– and further encourages – aggressive setting of contract terms on the part
of distributors. Specifically, the distributors’ desire to extract most of the
downstream profits leads them to offer terms that may not satisfy the
exhibitors’ participation constraint in expectation, and this results in fre-
quent requests for adjustments ex post. The frequency with which they
engage in renegotiations, combined with the value of their future relation-
ship, gives both parties incentives to agree to new terms fairly quickly. Thus
the cost of renegotiating terms for a particular movie in a particular week
must be low. And indeed, industry participants note that firms sometimes
disagree and retaliation can occur, but it is rare for this to occur. Still, once
multiplied by the number of potential occasions for renegotiation, these
costs can become sizable and thus parties have incentives to try and keep
the frequency of renegotiation low and thus maximize the surplus from the
relationship (Masten [1988], Klein [1996]).
Our simple model predicts that renegotiations in favor of the exhibitor
will be more often necessary for movies whose box office outcomes, ex ante,
is more difficult to predict and for those that perform below expectations ex
post. We can test these implications with data on renegotiation that we have
for each theater-movie-week for a subset of our contracts, namely 274 of
our 430 movies, in 25 theaters, for a total of 2844 theater-movie runs and
8983 theater-movie-week observations. We use a probit model to estimate
the relationship between renegotiation, set equal to one if the weekly
sharing term for the movie was renegotiated in a given week during the
movie run at a given theater, and movie performance and theater charac-
teristics. As we expect observations for a movie in a given theater to be
15 Kenney and Klein [1983] similarly note that, in the context of the diamond industry, the
CSO offers a ‘warranty’ to diamond dealers who purchase their packets by promising that
gross classification ‘mistakes’ will be corrected. We expect that such corrections occur much
more often in our context because exhibitors do not earn much rent, while Kenney and Klein
suggest that dealers in the diamond industry earn significant amounts of rent.
16 Filson et al. [2005], in contrast, document some instances of two-sided renegotiations in
the U.S. context.
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correlated, we cluster errors at the theater-movie level throughout. Results,
in the form of marginal effects, are summarized in Table VI.
Testing the implications from the model, however, requires that we
measure the predictability of movie revenues as well as whether, in the end,
the results meet expectations, on a weekly level. We approach this issue in
several different ways.
First, in Table II, columns 3 and 4, we showed that Spanish box office
prediction errors are negatively related to U.S. box office revenues. We
also noted that industry insiders view the predictability of movies as
inversely related to their results in the U.S., with movies that are never
released there as those whose results are the least predictable. Given this,
in the first three columns of Table VI, we use U.S. Release and U.S. Box
Office revenues to measure predictability. We expect renegotiation to be
negatively related to both of these such that the frequency of renegotiation
is highest for those movies never released in the U.S. and those with low
U.S. box office results.
In addition, as mentioned above, we should find more frequent renego-
tiations of shares for movies that do poorly relative to expectations. In the
first three columns of Table VI, we measure deviation from expectations
using the error term from our regression in column 2 of Table II. As this
variable is equal to zero for movies that were never released in the U.S., its
inclusion in our regression amounts to the inclusion of an interaction term
between deviation and U.S. release.
Our measures of predictability and of deviation from expectations are
at the movie, not the movie-theater-week level. In the first column of
Table VI, we address this by showing results for only the first week upon
release (column 1) for any theater-movie combination. In columns 2 and 3,
we use all weeks of data for each theater-movie, but we introduce a variable
that controls for the frequency with which we observe popular movies,
namely the interaction of U.S. Box Office results with Weeks since Release
for each theater-movie-week observation.
Table VI shows that, whether we focus on just the first week of the movie
run, or use all weeks, increased predictability reduces the likelihood of
renegotiation. In addition, the frequency of renegotiation is lower for
movies that do much better than expected and thus show a high positive
deviation from expectations. In other words, results are very consistent
with the predictions of our simple model regarding renegotiation. Finally,
these results are robust to the inclusion of theater/exhibitor characteristics
and demand shifters such as holiday weeks (column 3).
In the last three columns of Table VI, we rely on a different approach to
capture the weekly potential for disappointment about the movie’s per-
formance. Though we do not observe movie-specific box office results at
the weekly level in our data, we have data on theater-level weekly box office
results. In these data, we can rely on the fact that movies are shown in
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several theaters, and using the technique described in Gil [2004] to attribute
shares of box office revenues for each movie at each theater each week. We
then calculate the average weekly box office results, which we use as our
measure of expected box office outcome, and the difference between a
movie’s estimated revenues in each theater each week and the above
average, which we use as our measure of deviation from expectations.
Results, shown in columns 4 to 6, confirm again that the frequency of
renegotiation is lower for movies that have higher expected revenues, and
that renegotiation occurs less frequently when movie results (in a particular
week at a particular theater) exceed expectations. In particular, outcomes
for movies that exceed expectations by $1,000 Euros in any given week are
about 4 percentage points less likely to be renegotiated.
The results obtained with either approach also are robust to the inclusion
of theater/exhibitor characteristics and other control variables (column 5
or 6). As for the effects of the control variables themselves, we find few
significant effects. This is perhaps not surprising given that renegotiation is
at the theater-movie-week level while theater characteristics remain con-
stant from week to week for a given movie run. As for the effect of
increased movie competition, it is accounted for already in our measure of
expected movie revenues in columns 3 and 5.
IV(iv). Why Not Risk Sharing or Marginal Incentives?
Some of the features of the distributor/exhibitor relationship and their
contractual agreements, and some of the results highlighted above, already
imply that risk sharing and marginal incentives are not central concerns in
this setting. In this section, we discuss other evidence that leads us to
conclude that they are not viable explanations for the use of revenue
sharing in the present setting.
First, both exhibitors and distributors are involved in large numbers of
transactions. As mentioned earlier, during the 18 months of our data, the
average theater showed 111 movies, while the average distributor dealt with
40 theaters for each of its 20 movies. Moreover, the exhibitors whose data
we rely on all own several theaters. Both the size of these companies, and
the fact that they are all involved in large numbers of transactions, imply
important levels of diversification that make it unlikely that risk-sharing, or
even the basic insurance/incentive tradeoff emphasized in the agency litera-
ture, plays a major role in the present context.
Second, when they are used to resolve either risk sharing or double-sided
moral hazard issues, share contracts typically entail lump-sum fees in addi-
tion to revenue shares. Under risk sharing, the larger shares of revenues
retained by the distributor under high-risk situations – larger shares that
are necessary to allocate more risk to this less risk averse party – must
be accompanied by a lump-sum fee paid back to the exhibitor for the
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exhibitor’s participation constraint to be satisfied (e.g., Stiglitz [1974]).17
Similarly, under double-sided moral hazard with no risk aversion, Bhatta-
charyya and Lafontaine [1995] show that an affine contract implements
the first-best, but since the share parameter depends on the desired strength
of incentives on both sides, a lump-sum transfer is needed to satisfy the
agent’s participation constraint (see their appendix). Yet we find no such
fees in our data.
Third, the existence of a process by which exhibitors can turn to distribu-
tors and request renegotiated shares for those weeks when movies perform
below expectations directly contradicts the notion that share contracts are
used for risk-sharing purposes. Assuming, as has been typical in this litera-
ture, that the exhibitor is the more risk-averse party, and thus the one who
should be protected from negative outcomes, the renegotiation option
already insures the exhibitors against bad outcomes, making it unlikely that
revenue sharing would be needed for that purpose. Moreover, if distribu-
tors were to be considered the more risk averse party, they should not be
willing to insure exhibitors against bad outcomes as they do, regardless of
the fact that revenue sharing might be construed as a mechanism to lower
the risk they face under this scenario.
Finally, as mentioned above, the contracts involve systematically
decreasing distributor shares with time since release. Yet from a double-
sided moral hazard perspective, we find no evidence of a systematic
decrease in distributor, and increase in exhibitor, effort required over the
weeks that follow the release of a movie to justify this pattern in distributor
shares. Consistent with Filson et al. [2005], we see evidence that almost all
costs and effort requirements, by distributors and exhibitors, have been
expanded or committed to by the time the movie goes into theaters. This
led Filson et al. to conclude that sharing plays an insurance role in this
context. Instead, we propose that in the face of highly uncertain movie
values that differ across locations and over time, revenue sharing does
better than fixed weekly rental prices because it allows the compensation of
both parties to adjust automatically to ex-post realized values, and thus
reduces the need to resort as frequently to renegotiation ex post. Though it
by no means eliminates such costs, this form of contracting also has the
benefit of reducing the amount of ex-ante haggling – since the number of
contract terms is kept low and parties know that payments will automati-
cally adjust to ex-post values.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have explained the use of box-office revenue sharing in
movie exhibition contracts as a way to devise flexible weekly rental (or
17 See footnote 7.
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wholesale) prices for movies. We view the form of the contracts, which
are agreed upon before the first week realization of box office results,
as a means for distributors to extract most of the downstream surplus
in the presence of very uncertain movie values across markets and time.
We have shown that this flexible pricing argument captures several
important features of these contracts. In particular, we find that distribu-
tors retain higher shares for themselves, and that their share goes down
more slowly over weeks since release, for movies that are expected
to do well in the Spanish market. We also found that distributors get
lower shares when dealing with exhibitors with higher market shares
of seats in the local market, holding everything else constant, as should
happen according to our model (higher c, either because of the direct
opportunity cost of showing a movie, or equivalently, because of greater
exhibitor bargaining power). Finally, we discussed how renegotiated
shares are relied upon to compensate exhibitors for below-expectation
outcomes in specific weeks. We showed that such renegotiations occur
more frequently in cases where movie results are more difficult to predict
and when results are below expectations. Both of these data patterns
are consistent with the idea that the share contracts represent a formulaic
way to set flexible rental prices for the movies, where the contracts
are meant to extract basically most or all of the willingness to pay of
exhibitors.
We believe that risk-sharing and marginal incentive arguments cannot
explain several aspects of the contracting practices in this setting, includ-
ing the absence of fixed fees and the one-sidedness of the renegotiations
that occur in this industry. Without denying the importance of marginal
incentive effects in other settings, we expect that our argument that
revenue sharing can be a way to achieve flexible pricing applies also in
other contexts, including other parts of movie production and distribu-
tion, but also in settings such as publisher/author relations, mall leases,
franchising and licensing. In fact, Cachon and Larivière’s [2005] conclu-
sion that revenue sharing better coordinates the video rental channel, as
well as Mortimer’s [2008] result that video stores, distributors and con-
sumers do better under revenue sharing, also fundamentally amount to
the idea that these contracts lead to ‘better’ prices between channel
members, prices that then lead to the right choices of quantity (here,
allocation of limited screen resources to movies).
We hope that our argument, and the evidence supporting it, will help
advance not only our understanding of the movie distribution industry,
but also of share contracts more generally, beyond the standard risk-
sharing and incentive arguments that are now common in the literature,
and that themselves replaced the initial notion that share contracts were
by definition inefficient, and simply a reflection of poorly functioning
market institutions.
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APPENDIX A
In what follows, based on the assumptions in the paper, we first derive optimal
contract terms for the three types of contracts of interest, and then compare the
profitability of the different contracts from the distributor’s perspective.
A(i). Box-Office Revenue-Sharing Contracts
With a contract that specifies the shares of revenues s1 and s2 that the distributor will
receive in each period, the profit function of the distributor is
s R f R dR s R f R dR
v E R
1 1 1 1
0
2 2 2 2 2
0
1 2
( ) Pr( ) ( )
( | )∫ ∫+ Show Showγ
where Show2 indicates the movie is shown in period 2. This profit function is subject
to the participation constraint of the theater each period, namely
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In period 2, the theater will show the movie if period 1 revenues are high enough.
Specifically, since period 2 revenues are bounded above by gR1, the theater will show
the movie in period 2 only if its participation constraint is satisfied in expectations. We












Given our distributional assumptions, the distributor’s profit maximization problem
can now be written as
max



































subject to the participation constraints of the theater above.
Note that, with per period shares, the problem is separable. Thus the distributor
will set the share for the first week at the level that maximizes his expected revenues
subject to the exhibitor’s participation constraint. Given that the distributor profits
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In other words, s1∗ extracts all expected profits from the movie in period one. Clearly,
this optimal share is increasing in v, or in movie i expected box office revenues (=v/2).
It is, however, decreasing in c/2, the expected value of alternative movies available at
the same time. Finally, it is decreasing in k, the operational costs of theater j.
(Note that in reality, first-period shares for very promising movies are rarely above
60%. Assuming that alternative movies are such that they generate box office revenues
that are perhaps 20 or 30 per cent lower, of which the theater can expect to keep about
50% as well, then c and even c + 2k assuming k is low enough, could well be somewhat
below .5v, leading to an optimal first period share of 60% according to our solution
above.)
For period 2, however, the participation constraint does not bind. Let us call the











If the participation constraint were binding, the probability of showing the movie in
period 2 would equal zero and thus expected distributor profits in the second period
would also be equal to zero. For that reason, the distributor will choose a share s2∗ that
is lower than s2. Using the equation for s2 above, it is easy to show that, since g < 1 by
assumption, s s2 1< ∗ and therefore s s2 1∗ < ∗.
The solution above involves the distributor choosing a second period share that
increases the likelihood that the exhibitor keeps the movie on the screen even when R1
is not high. This leads to positive expected profits for the exhibitor ex ante. Substi-
tuting the value of s1∗ in the profit function but leaving s2 as is, we get:

































We conclude for now that there exists an s2∗ that is smaller than s1∗ that solves this
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that we can rewrite as
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Thus the optimal s2∗ is increasing in movie expected revenues
v
2 and in g, the revenue
retention rate from week to week. In addition, we can ascertain how the decrease in

































Since both terms are positive and s2∗ does not have a closed form solution, the sign
of rate of change in sharing terms in relation to v is ambiguous. However, the model
implies that the change in shares from period 1 to period 2 will be smaller if g, the rate
of retention of revenues from week to week, is larger.
A(ii). Fixed Weekly Fees Contracts
The problem of the distributor who uses a fixed weekly fees contract – where the fixed
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where G represents the higher renegotiation costs associated with fixed prices com-
pared to revenue sharing, subject to the participation constraint of the theater each
period.
The probability of showing the movie in the second period depends on the pay-
ments from exhibitor to distributor in that period, and on the first period box-office
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Given the objective function of the distributor, which is increasing in T1, the partici-

















This differs from the value of T2 that just satisfies the participation constraint
( = − −γv c k22 ) because the exhibitor must have incentives to keep the movie on the screen
in the second period. Note that T2* is positive and feasible as long as gn - c - 2k > 0.
If this condition is not satisfied, the optimal T2 0* = .
A(iii). Ex-Ante Lump-Sum Fee Contracts




where we again use G to represent the higher renegotiation costs associated with fixed
fee contracts. Note that one could argue that the cost of renegotiation could be higher
or lower under upfront than weekly fees. For one thing, there are more potential
terms to be renegotiated under weekly fees. However, there is less at stake each time,
so the cost of achieving a compromise for each may be lower. Also, there are circum-
stances where the movie is not shown in period 2, and this is more likely to occur with
weekly than upfront fixed fees. Of course, no renegotiation will be needed in period 2
in those cases. We therefore cannot say a priori which contract leads to higher
renegotiation costs. However, it is straightforward to see in the next section that
renegotiation costs would have to be much higher under fixed upfront fees than
weekly fees to make the latter dominate the former. We do not believe this is the case,
and thus for simplicity we assume the same G applies for both types of contracts.
The distributor maximizes its profit subject to the participation constraint of the
theater in each period:
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and
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Clearly the solution to this problem is such that T makes the overall participation
constraint of the theater bind, namely
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A(iv). Comparing Distributor Profits Across Contract Types
We can calculate distributor profits for each of the contractual forms above by
substituting solutions for s1, s2, T1, T2 and T in the corresponding distributor profit
function. For simplicity, in this section, we set k = 0.
For the upfront fixed fee contract, expected distributor profits are
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For the sliding scale of fixed terms T1 and T2, distributor profits are
















It is easy to show that Π ΠT T T> 1 2, and therefore we are left comparing PT and Ps. (It
should be clear from this that the renegotiation costs for the weekly fees contract
would have to be much higher than that of the upfront fixed fee contract to overturn
the profit advantage of the upfront fixed fee contract.)
We find that profits under revenue sharing contracts are
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In this case, we only know that the distributor profits are maximized for a value of s2
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s (sharing terms average 50% in our data). Then comparing distributor
profits from revenue sharing to those obtained under an optimally chosen lump-sum
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Thus, for high enough renegotiations costs it is optimal to use revenue sharing
contracts rather than upfront (and also weekly, per above) fixed fees.
In sum, although there is no reason to expect that the optimal s2 12= , we have
shown that distributor profits can be greater under a revenue sharing contract with s1∗
and s2 12= than under the other two forms of contracts. Of course, if we allowed the
maximum number of weeks over which the movie can generate positive revenues to be
variable, the renegotiation cost advantage of revenue sharing only becomes greater.
We conclude that, consistent with industry behavior, revenue sharing can dominate
the other two forms of contracts.
APPENDIX B
DATA APPENDIX
We have information on the contracts used in the distribution of 510 movies shown in
up to 96 theaters between January 2001 and June 2002. Most of the movies are shown
in a subset of the 96 theaters, so the total number of contracts is 13,816. After
eliminating contracts for theaters owned by distributors, and a few contracts that are
not for first runs, our final sample relates to 430 movies shown in up to
91 theaters in 51 different cities, for a total of 10,167 contracts. The 430 movies were
distributed by 22 different distributors. The 91 theaters are owned by seven exhibitors.
The data on movie run length were collected separately, via major Spanish news-
papers for theaters operating in Madrid and Catalonia (see Gil [2004]). We only have
this information for a subset of our data, namely those movies that were playing in
these theaters. We have verified that within the set of 3,706 contracts for which we
observe this variable, the descriptive statistics for weeks stipulated are similar to those
of our overall sample. Specifically, at the movie/theater (movie) level, the mean weeks
stipulated in the set of 3,706 contracts is 5.38 (4.76), with a standard deviation of 3.15
(2.94). For the number of weeks between min and max, these figures are 3.40 (2.76)
and 2.10 (1.61) and for the number of weeks at maximum share, they are 1.28 (1.19)
and 0.54 (0.41) respectively.
Most of the movies in our sample (63% of them) were released in the U.S. prior
to their Spanish release. This includes several non-U.S. movies. In fact, 50 of the
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63% are movies produced in the U.S., with the remaining 13% produced in Asia or
the U.K. At the time our data were collected (2001–2002), simultaneous global
releases were not as common as they are today. In 2001 the gap between releases in
the U.S. and Spain was large enough that Spanish managers could rely on U.S.
release information. Of course, Spanish movies are always released first in Spain,
except for ‘The Others,’ a Spanish production starring Nicole Kidman. For other
European movies, while they might have been released and become hits in their own
countries, those not released in the U.S. prior to their release in other European
nations tend to be lower budget and more specialized movies, such that, according
to industry members, it is difficult to infer their success in Spain based on outcomes
in other European countries.
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